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The Course, of course
Introduction
Ferdinand de Saussure is regarded as the father of modern linguistics. His child, a Methuselah now, is still not entirely 
unlike him. There are very many writings to praise the role his Course in General Linguistics
(Ferdinand de Saussure Cours de Linguistique Générale. Paris, Payot. 1922.
Ferdinand de Saussure Cours de Linguistique Générale. Édition critique préparée par Tullio de Mauro. Paris, Payot. 
1978.
Ferdinand de Saussure Course in General Linguistics Trans. by Roy Harris. London, Duckworth. 1983.
Jonathan Culler Saussure Glasgow, Fontana/Collins. 1976.
Émile Benveniste "Saussure après un demi-siècle" in Problèmes de Linguistique Générale. Paris, Gallimard. 1966.)
 played in the history of linguistics, there are only a few to criticize its shortcomings. The Course is, indeed, a mixture 
of ingenious vision, elegant statements and far-reaching, latent confusion. This paper, unjustly and one-sidedly, 
concentrates almost exclusively on the contradictions.
First, it is worth investigating three distinctions which will lead right into the heart of Saussure's theory of 
language:
(1.) Langue (language-system) has to be distinguished from parole (language-behaviour) produced on the basis of the 
rules of the system.
(John Lyons Semantics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1977. Vol. I. 239. )
(2.) Well-formed utterances, that is, utterances produced according to the rules of the language have to be distinguished 
from mistakes. (Cours, 36.; Course, 18.)
(3.) Fait de langue has be distinguished from fait de parole. In other words, the language of the community has to be 
distinguished from the speech of some speakers.
The third distinction may not be so obvious as the second or so well-known as the first. It is, for example, missing from 
the new English translation:
"Comment s'est effectuée cette substitution de war à was? Quelques personnes, influencée par waren, ont créé war par 
analogie; c'était un fait de parole; cette forme, souvent répétéé et accepté par la communauté, est devenue un fait de 
langue." (Cours, 138.)
"How did this substitution of war for was come about? A few people, on the basis of waren, created the analogical form 
war. This form, constantly repeated and accepted by the community, became part of the language." (Course, 97.)
The function of the distinction is to distance language-behaviour from language-system and to support the statement 
according to which changes can creep into the latter only through the former. But if somebody makes a mistake, that is, 
creates the form war, it will not follow in any way from this fait de parole that the mistake should be repeated 
frequently. Why do `quelques personnes' insist on making mistakes? Is it reasonable to suppose that the community has 
a system of rules that some of the speakers regularly defy? Saussure could have claimed:
(i.)  there is no difference between was and war,
(ii.) war does not exist,
(iii.) the speakers who say was are not members of the same language community as the ones who say war.
Although any of these solutions could have been chosen for various reasons, they would not have been more 
satisfactory than the distinction between fait de parole and fait de langue.
It seems necessary to have a look at Saussure's distiction between langue and parole. There is, on the one hand, 
the mumbo jumbo, meaningless in itself, produced by the speech organs. Saussure defines parole as "the sum total of 
what people say". (Cours, 38.; Course, 19.) There is, on the other hand, a system of rules with the help of which 
meaning can be attributed to parole. Saussure claimed that langue is:
(1) "necessary in order that speech [parole] should be intelligible" (Cours, 19.; Course, 37.)
(2) "the whole set of linguistic habits which enables the speaker to understand and make himself understood" (Cours, 
112.; Course, 77.)
According to Saussure's theory, the noises produced by people cannot be faits de parole and cannot be intelligible, 
unless there is a system of rules behind them. If this is the case, can there be a single fait de parole without 
corresponding faits de langue? Is, then, war a fait de langue or a fait de parole? It is obviously both. In spite of this, 
Saussure maintained that war was not a fait de langue even for those speakers who kept repeating it. He thought that 
war was a fait de parole without any equivalent in langue. But whose langue are we talking about? Saussure recognized 
only one langue, the langue of the community, and thought that each member of the language community had an 
identical copy of this langue. Saussure's theory implies that forms like war can only have the status of mistakes as long 
as they are not accepted by the whole language community. But the repetition of war is not a sign of some speakers' 
indulgence in making mistakes or of their capricious behaviour. Would it not be more reasonable to suppose that they 
follow their own rules?
The first two distinctions are correct but the third has to be modified:
(3.') The varieties of language have to be distinguished from each other. Language is not homogeneous.
Saussure failed to notice this error, the consequences of which are spread throughout his theory. Accordingly, the 
present paper will try to detect these consequences in Saussure's views on (a) langue and parole, (b) identity, (c) 
deviation, (d) dialects, (e) synchronic and diachronic linguistics, (f) understanding.
A. Langue and parole
Saussure thought that "language [langage] in its totality is unknowable, for it lacks homogeneity." (Cours, 38.; Course, 
20.) Although it is obvious from the context that the sentence refers to Saussure's views that langage consists of a 
mixture of both langue and parole, what remained after the removal of heterogeneity was a `pure' langue, that is, a 
system of rules which is adopted by each and every member of the language community. Langue, according to him, is:
(1.) "like a dictionary of which each individual has an identical copy" (Cours, 38.; Course, 19.),
(2.) "a grammatical system existing potentially in every brain" (Cours, 30.; Course, 13.),
(3.) "a social bond". (Cours, 30.; Course, 13.)
Saussure does not mention that in his `speech circuit', when A is talking to B, there is a chance that A and B might 
associate different concepts with the same image acoustique. (Cours, 27-28.; Course, 11-12.) But even Saussure had to 
admit occasionally that not everybody speaks exactly alike. "All the individuals linguistically linked in this manner will 
establish among themselves a kind of mean; all of them will reproduce -- doubtless not exactly, but approximately -- 
the same signs linked to the same concepts." (Cours, 29.; Course, 13.) This is the reason why he thought that the perfect 
form of langue exists not in the individual speakers' `brain' but "in the collectivity." (Cours, 30.; Course, 13.) He 
managed to keep langue clear from heterogeneity by abstracting from the speech of some speakers. It hardly needs any 
emphasis that by ignoring the language of some speakers of the language community, it is impossible to grasp the 
"conventions adopted by society", (Cours, 25.; Course, 10.) unless the word `society' means `a segment of society', 
however large this segment may actually be. Saussure's langue satisfies the requirements of homogeneity in more than 
one way. It is:
(i.)  distinguished from parole,
(ii.) free from the rules `quelques personnes' use in their speech,
(iii.) "both a self-contained whole and a principle of classification. As soon as we give linguistic structure [langue] 
pride of place among the facts of language [langage], we introduce a natural order into an aggregate which lends itself 
to no other classification." (Cours, 25.; Course, 10.)
Saussure went as far as to declare: "it is no absurdity to say that it is linguistic structure [langue] which gives language 
what unity it has." (Cours, 27.; Course, 11.)
B. Identity
(1.) "We assign identity, for instance, to two trains (`the 8.45 from Geneva to Paris'), one of which leaves twenty-four 
hours after the other. We treat it as the `same' train, even though probably the locomotive, the carriages, the staff etc. 
are not the same." (Cours, 151.; Course, 107.)
(2.) "Whenever the same conditions are fulfilled, the same entities reappear." (Cours, 151.; Course, 107.)
(3.) "The link between the two uses of the same word is not based upon material identity, nor upon exact similarity of 
meaning..." (Cours, 152.; Course, 107.)
(4.) "What characterizes each [item in the same system] most exactly is being whatever the others are not." (Cours, 
162.; Course, 115.)
(5.) "If two people from different regions of France say se fƒcher (`to become angry') and se f“cher respectively, the 
difference is very minor in comparison with the grammatical facts which allow us to recognize in these two forms one 
and the same unit." (Cours, 249-250.; Course, 180.)
On the basis of the above statements, it does not seem absolutely absurd to raise the question whether it might be 
possible that the two forms, war and was, are, in fact, identical. Although the identity in this case would not be "based 
upon material identity", the two words perform the same syntactic function and they are what "others are not", which 
means whenever they are used, the same conditions are fulfilled.
In Saussure's theory the entities of the linguistic system gain their identity from the system. They are 
recognizable as long as there is a system in which they can perform their function. Their existence can be characterized 
by saying that esse est percipi by their own langue. This statement might seem a little far-fetched at first but it is 
exactly the situation Saussure had in mind:
"Synchronic linguistics will be concerned with logical and psychological connexions between coexisting items 
constituting a system, as perceived by the same collective consciousness. 
Diachronic linguistics on the other hand will be concerned with connexions between sequences of items not 
perceived by the same collective consciousness, which replace one another without themselves constituting a system." 
(Cours, 140.; Course, 98.)
"In order to determine to what extent something is a reality, it is necessary and also sufficient to find out to what extent 
it exists as far as the language users are concerned." (Course, 89.)
"pour savoir dans quelle mesure une chose est une réalité, il faudra et il suffira de rechercher dans quelle mesure elle 
existe pour la conscience des sujets." (Cours, 128.)
Saussure also mentioned that only by suppressing the past can the linguist investigate "the state of mind of the language 
users [la conscience des sujets parlants]" (Cours, 117.; Course, 81.) Within the confines of this definition, Saussure 
relied on more than one type of identity. One of these types could be called the `identity of the determinate space' 
(`identity as space' for short). Material, even phonemic differences matter very little within this type. Se fâcher and se 
fôcher can be one and the same unit; the train can be the same despite obvious differences; the street can be 
reconstructed entirely and still be the same; (Cours, 151.; Course, 107.) a knight in chess can be replaced by an object 
of quite different shape and material. (Cours, 153-154.; Course, 108-109.) The entities of language defined by this type 
of identity are "whatever the others are not", that is, they are defined negatively. To put it another way, the execution of 
image acoustique does not belong to langue, (Cours, 36.; Course, 18.) it belongs to parole. There is a considerable 
latitude in the way the entities can materialize as long as they are not confused with other entities defined, in turn, by 
their own function. Each entity is to some extent an empty space that can be filled by very different materials from time 
to time and each is circumscribed by all the other entities.
War and was can be identical in this way but then it is impossible to distinguish between them on the basis of 
their being either faits de langue or faits de parole. Although it is true that they differ phonemically but so do se fâcher 
and se fôcher. Which one is the real entity? Neither and both. Both can perform the same role within the system and 
neither should be considered as more basic. They should not be distinguished from each other. Theoretically the 
following possibilities seem to be open:
(i.)  they are identical,
(ii.) they are different,
(iii.) they are partly identical.
If they are identical what does the form they have in langue look like? Did Saussure really manage to get rid of all 
kinds of heterogeneity if the entities of langue are, from the point of view of phonemes, full of opposite possibilities? 
And would it not be more illuminating to say that deviations also represent the norm, or, to put it more bluntly, 
deviation is the norm if this seems to be what some of Saussure's statements imply? If, on the other hand, they are not 
the same, how can they perform exactly the same function within the system, which they undoubtedly do?
The third possibility can be excluded very easily. Saussure did not rely on partial identity. Quite the contrary, 
what Saussure said was that "The mechanism of a language [le mécanisme linguistique] turns entirely on identities and 
differences. The latter are merely the counterparts of the former." (Cours, 151.; Course, 107.) The expression "partial 
identity" counts as an oxymoron in the Saussurian tradition. When John Lyons speaks of "slightly different languages" 
he is relying not on the structuralist theory but on his common sense. Introduction to Theoretical Linguistics 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 1969. 407. From the point of view of the theory, "slightly different 
languages" are the same as "entirely different languages" or simply "different languages". It is worth quoting Uriel 
Weinreich who saw the nature of the problem very clearly: "Since in a perfect system all parts are interrelated (`tout se 
tient'), it is hard to see how systems could even be conceived as partially similar of different; one would think that they 
could only be wholly identical or different. Considerations of this nature prevented orthodox Saussureanism of the 
Geneva school from undertaking the study of gradually changing systems, since it was felt that languages could only be 
compared, if at all, at discrete `stages'." Uriel Weinreich "Is a Structural Dialectology Possible? Word 10 (1954) 388-
400. 391. "Linguistic systems in a strictly structural view can only be identical or different." (Weinreich "Is a 
Structural..." 389.)
It seems quite obvious that whatever solution we may come up with, some contradictions will stay with us -- as 
long as we are willing to accept Saussure's theoretical framework.
C. Deviation
Another type of identity could be called the `identity of the definite norm' (`identity as norm' for short). Some of 
Saussure's examples can only be interpreted in this way. Within this type the material differences of the linguistic 
entities cannot go beyond phonemic differences. As opposed to the undifferentiated unity of war and was, se fƒcher and 
se f“cher, this type of identity explains how one of these forms could be distinguished from every other form.
Saussure could as well have said that war does not exist. Indeed, he should have done so. He made deviation an 
indispensable part of linguistic theory. His theory allows, what is more, forces the linguist to look upon forms which 
deviate from the norm as representing the norm: "the execution of sound patterns in no way affects the system itself. In 
this respect one may compare a language to a symphony. The symphony has a reality of its own, which is independent 
of the way in which it is performed. The mistakes the musicians may make in no way compromise that reality." (Cours, 
36.; Course, 18.) When linguistic phenomena are viewed from this perspective, every time a form, different from was 
but having the syntactic function of was occurs, it will be regarded as a mistake, a deviation and it will be reduced to 
was without any trace. Despite all this, Saussure insisted that war exists, even if only as a fait de parole. But the 
existence of war can only be guaranteed by a subsequent langue in which it will perform the function of the norm. This 
type of identity could be called the `identity of the subsequent norm'. But Saussure should have ignored war anyway 
because he declared that "studying a linguistic state amounts in practice to ignoring unimportant changes". (Cours, 
142.; Course, 100.) Is war important or unimportant? What are the important changes like? What are the changes like 
which should not be ignored when one is studying a language state?
If Saussure's langue existed, it could never change. Nothing could "compromise that reality". (The word reality 
suggests that Saussure knew, long before Austin, how to do things with words.) "In social and cultural systems 
behaviour may deviate frequently and considerably from the norm without impugning the existence of the norm." 
(Culler Saussure, 9.) Langue, by allowing any amount of deviation, permits no amount of change.
Saussure in fact thought that neither the individuals nor the community can change langue: "the individual has 
no power to alter a sign in any respect once it has become established in a linguistic community." (Cours, 101.; Course, 
68.) "Nor can the linguistic community exercise its authority to change even a single word." (Cours, 104.; Course, 71.) 
This is perfectly understandable within this theory. But one of the arguments Saussure offered in favour of the 
invariability of the sign is rather strange. Language is:
"something all make use of every day. In this respect it is quite unlike other social institutions. Legal procedures, 
religious rites, ships' flags, etc. are systems used only by a certain number of individuals acting together and for a 
limited time. A language, on the contrary, is something in which everyone participates all the time, and that is why it is 
constantly open to the influence of all." (Course, 74.)
"[La langue] ... elle est une chose dont tous les individus se servent toute la journée. Sur ce point, on ne peut établir 
aucune comparaison entre elle et les autres institutions. Les prescriptions d'un code, les rites d'une religion, les signaux 
maritimes, etc., n'occupent jamais qu'un certain nombre d'individus à la fois et pendant un temps limité; la langue, au 
contraire, chacun y participe à tout instant, et c'est pourquoi elle subit sans cesse l'influence de tous. (Cours, 107.)
It would require quite a long explanation to prove how invariability could be a logical consequence of being 
"constantly open to the influence of all". (The passage quoted is very interesting anyway, because it is here that 
Saussure explicitly denies the similarity between la langue and "les prescriptions d'un code" and "les signaux 
maritimes".)
There is something paradoxical about how the assumption of linguistic homogeneity makes its presence felt. 
Homogeneity of language has become a tacit assumption, while deviation, an apparently visible and analyzable 
consequence of this assumption, has been investigated very often. The theory of deviation, the function of which is to 
clean up the mess, the material left unexplained by the theory proper, was doomed to success in modern stylistics. 
Homogeneity has always remained only an assumption but it has the magic power of creation: deviation has acquired 
the status of fact. But when deviation is severed from the assumption of homogeneity, it is not easy to see how 
comprehensive the problem is. The assumption of homogeneity implies statements about the language of each member 
of the community while deviation is a random individual act which may or may not occur. Deviation disperses the 
overall problem into disconnected, capricious behaviour which has nothing to do with the so-called normal, rule 
governed utterances of the language community.
Whether Marxism and the Philosophy of Language was written by V. N. Volosinov or by M. M. Bakhtin, it 
clearly shows the direct influence of Saussure: "At any one period of time only one linguistic norm can exist: either 
`ich was' or `ich war'. A norm can only coexist with its violation and not with another, contradictory norm." (V. N. 
Volosinov Marxism and the Philosophy of Language Trans. by Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik. New York and 
London, Seminar Press. 1973. 56.) Whoever the author of this passage may be, Bakhtin, one of the most important 
theorists of linguistic diversity, assumed the existence of "only one linguistic norm" in all his works: "Language -- like 
the living concrete environment in which the consciousness of the verbal artist lives -- is never unitary. It is unitary 
only as an abstract grammatical system of normative forms, taken in isolation from the concrete, ideological 
conceptualizations that fill it, and in isolation from the uninterrupted process of historical becoming that is a 
characteristic of all living language." (M. M. Bakhtin "Discourse in the Novel" in The Dialogic Imagination Austin and 
London, University of Texas Press. 1981. 288.) Had Bakhtin revised Saussure's and Meillet's views on the unity and 
homogeneity of language, he could have developed a very different theory of linguistic diversity.
D. Dialects
Besides langue and parole, Saussure also distinguished the internal and the external linguistics of the langue. Although 
it is not without importance, the latter distinction has received less attention by linguists than the former. Why, for 
example, are problems like the connexion of langue "with institutions of every sort: church, school, etc." (Cours, 41.; 
Course, 21.) more closely related to the -- internal or external -- linguistics of the langue than syntax or phonology 
which Saussure relegated to the linguistics of the parole?
The internal linguistics of the langue describes the structure of language, its "unique relational structure, or 
system", Lyons Semantics, Vol. I. 231. while stylistics or psycholinguistics can investigate how, when and where the 
system of rules is used or misused. This is the origin of the `pragmatic wastebasket'. (Yehoshua Bar-Hillel "Out of the 
Pragmatic Wastebasket" Linguistic Inquiry 11 (1971) 401-407.)
It is also very interesting how Saussure dealt with dialects, the most obvious manifestation of diversity in 
natural languages. He excluded the study of dialects from internal linguistics, that is, from linguistics proper. His 
internal linguistics investigates "everything which concerns the system and its rules". (Cours, 43.; Course, 23.) But he 
had to admit "It is on this point, doubtless, that the distinction between external linguistics and internal linguistics 
appears most paradoxical." (Cours, 41.; Course, 22.)
Not only did Saussure exclude the study of dialects from internal linguistics but he linked it with historical 
linguistics. His expression "fragmentation into dialects" (Cours, 41.; Course, 22.) is most revealing. Saussure looked 
upon linguistic diversity as the result of historical processes which transform the once homogeneous language into 
heterogeneous dialects. The reason why he refused to investigate synchronically what is brought about by the changes 
is precisely the heterogeneity of the phenomena which he regarded as "unknowable", although it is not quite clear why 
or how, in his theory, a homogeneous, unitary, discrete and invariable langue could give rise to any kind of 
heterogeneity.
But why does he say that the investigation of dialects involves paradoxes? Within the confines of his theory it 
would be understandable if he excluded dialects from the internal linguistics of langue. But, as we have seen, 
Saussure's theory of deviation allows the opposite method as well because it can reduce heterogeneity to homogeneity. 
Mistakes and deviation cannot compromise the "symphony". Sometimes, as we have seen in the case of se fƒcher and 
se f“cher, Saussure is certainly tempted to reduce dialectal differences to identity: "the difference is very minor in 
comparison with the grammatical facts which allow us to recognize in these two forms one and the same unit." (Cours, 
249-250.; Course, 180.) It certainly does not show the strength of a theory if it allows absolutely contradicting methods.
A passage from the chapter on dialects deserves closer attention: "those living at any given place will still 
understand the speech [le parler] of neighbouring regions. A traveller crossing the country from one side to the other 
will find only slight differences [variétés dialectales] between one locality and the next. But as he proceeds the 
differences accumulate, so that in the end he finds a language [langue] which would be incomprehensible to the 
inhabitants of the region he set out from." (Cours, 275.; Course, 199.) What constitutes a langue for Saussure? The 
system of rules of one dialect? Then why did he want to reduce dialectal differences to identity as in the case of se 
fâcher and se fôcher? Or the rules of a natural language? Then how is it possible that different dialects of the same 
langue are mutually incomprehensible? He defined langue, among others, as "the whole set of linguistic habits which 
enables the speaker to understand and make himself understood". (Cours, 112.; Course, 77.) There could be no lack of 
mutual understanding if the different dialects had a common langue in which understanding is presupposed.
If langue is necessarily bound up with intelligibility, then the slightly different but mutually understandable 
dialects will require a langue in which the dialectal differences are not destroyed or reduced to immediate identity. The 
langue of mutually comprehensible dialects would have to be the object of Saussure's internal linguistics because it 
would be concerned with the system and its rules. In spite of this, Saussure adopted the traveller's point of view, which, 
in turn, created its own object. The account of a journey as a temporal structure can be compared to historical 
linguistics. The traveller encounters differences one by one, he can treat the heterogeneity of dialects anecdotically. 
And, in fact, Saussure mentions that one of the methods of historical linguistics "involves simple narration of events." 
(Cours, 292.; Course, 212.)
As for war and was, they cannot belong to different language communities -- for the simple reason the one is 
replaced by the other within the same community.
E. Synchronic and diachronic linguistics
Saussure distinguished two major points of view in linguistics, the synchronic and the diachronic. He claimed that it is 
the points of view which create the objects to be investigated. (Cours, 23.; Course, 8.) He described the relation of the 
two points of view as incommensurable. One might think that languages cannot be but continuous in time and the 
identity of languages, as long as they exist, is never interrupted. It does not seem entirely unreasonable to suppose that 
there is always some kind of langue to ensure linguistic communication. In Saussure's theory, however, history and 
system have nothing in common as they are the products of different points of view.
It is not perfectly clear whether a new distinction is introduced beside the all-important one between langue and 
parole, or the distinction concerning temporality is a continuation, perhaps a consequence, of the one concerning 
system and behaviour. Synchronic linguistics, obviously, investigates langue. What, then, is the object of diachronic 
linguistics? Is it, by any chance, parole again? Then the new distinction would merely be another formulation or 
another aspect of langue and parole. This is not entirely implausible, since "everything which is diachronic in languages 
[langue] is only so through speech [parole]". (Cours, 138.; Course, 96-97.) The categories fait synchronique, fait 
statique, fait de langue and fait diachronique, fait ‚volutif, fait de parole, respectively, seem to be interchangeable 
equivalents. War has to be regarded as a fait de parole because it has no status in langue, because, confined to some 
speakers, it is a fait diachronique. If this is the case, it will be quite natural if system and history are thought to be as 
incompatible as langue and parole.
The history of language has proved to be an extremely difficult problem for the Saussurian tradition. The 
diachronic identity of languages was not, to say the least, taken for granted. We have already seen that dialectology, 
within the limits of Saussure's theory, belongs to historical linguistics, and after a few decades of structuralism Uriel 
Weinreich had to declare that there was an "abyss between structural and dialectological studies". (Weinreich "Is a 
Structural..." 388.) Saussure was, in a sense, not mistaken: "it is langue which gives language what unity it has" (Cours, 
27.; Course, 11.) -- at least in structuralist theories of language. It is rather difficult to answer the question whether the 
"state of disunity" (Weinreich "Is a Structural...", 388.), to borrow Weinreich's term, is really inevitable, or it is simply 
a consequence of the Saussurian theory of language.
Jonathan Culler seems to believe rather sincerely that the only reason to doubt the plausibility of Saussure's 
solution to the problem of diachronic identity of language could be the acceptance of some kind of "essentialist" 
position: "then", he points out, "the sign would have an essential core which would be unaffected by time or at least 
which would resist change." (Culler Saussure, 35.) However, objections to Saussure's theory does not necessarily imply 
objections to the arbitrary nature of the sign. To put it another way, it does not follow from what Culler says that 
Saussure's theory is not just a conventionalist theory but the only possible conventionalist theory.
Saussure, according to Culler, "recognized, more profoundly than his critics, the radical historicity of 
language", although "there is an apparent paradox here which requires elucidation". (Culler Saussure, 35.) He also adds 
that Saussure had not "deceived himself into thinking that language exists as a series of totally homogeneous 
synchronic states". (Culler Saussure, 37.) Both statements deserve attention.
Culler takes his example from the Course: "The diachronic identity of two words as different as calidum and 
chaud simply means that the transition of from one to the other was via a series of synchronic identities in speech 
[parole], without the link between them ever broken by successive sound changes." (Cours, 250.; Course, 180.) To this 
Culler adds the following `elucidation': "At one point calidum and calidu were interchangeable and synchronically 
identical, then later calidu and caldu, then caldu and cald, then cald and tɭalt, then tɭalt and tɭaut, then tɭaut and ɭaut, 
then ɭaut and ɭot, and finally ɭot and ɭo (the pronunciation of chaud). When we speak of the transformation of a word 
and postulate a diachronic identity we are in fact summarizing a parleyed series of synchronic identities." (Culler 
Saussure, 39.) This elucidation will hardly prove that the paradox is only an apparent one. Rather, it seems that the 
elucidation is sufficiently detailed to prove that there is a contradiction here which requires correction.
"At one point calidum and calidu were interchangeable and synchronically identical". First of all, Saussure did 
not say that they were synchronically identical but that they were synchronically identical in parole, which, in his 
theory, can be very different from their being identical in langue. But identity in parole can, at best, ensure the 
continuity of parole and cannot create the conditions which would guarantee the uninterrupted continuity of langue. Is 
parole a realm of independent existence? Culler says that parole is "actual speech, the speech acts which are made 
possible by the language"; (Culler Saussure, 29.) the distinction between langue and parole is a distinction "between the 
underlying system which makes possible various types of behaviour and actual instances of such behaviour". (Culler 
Saussure, 33.) It is parole that is made possible, or, to put it another way, what is not made possible, cannot count as 
parole. In order to show the extent parole depends on langue, Saussure once went as far as declaring: "Any words [Un 
mot] I improvise, like in-décor-able (`un-decorat-able') already exists potentially in the language [langue]." (Cours, 
227.; Course, 165.) What is, then, `identity in parole'? Culler is not mistaken when he says that in Saussure's theory: 
"Identity is wholly a function of differences within the system". (Culler Saussure, 28.) Wholly within the system, 
indeed, and not to any degree within parole. The identity within parole is wholly based on the identity within langue.
"At one point calidum and calidu were interchangeable and synchronically identical". Identical -- in which 
sense of the word? The identity of calidum has to be derived from `identity as norm', otherwise calidum and calidu are 
always, perfectly, indistinguishably identical, and not just "at one point". (Besides, perhaps even caldu, cald, tôalt, etc. 
would be equally identical and equally interchangeable.) The subsequent norm is also needed in order to establish the 
indentity of calidu. But what happens next? If there were two norms, calidum and calidu, both could always reassert 
themselves through deviation. Edward Sapir's `embarrassing question' could be adapted to the situation: if all the 
individual differences of speech are being constantly levelled out to the norm, why should we ever have linguistic 
changes at all? "Ought not the norm, wherever and whenever threatened, automatically to reassert itself? "If all the 
individual variations within a dialect are being constantly leveled out to the dialectic norm, if there is no appreciable 
tendency for the individual peculiarities to initiate a dialectic schism, why should we have dialectic variations at all? 
Ought not the norm, wherever and whenever threatened, automatically to reassert itself?" (Edward Sapir Language. An 
Introduction to the Study of Speech New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co. 1949. 150.) Or, as Saussure put it, changes are 
"merely multiple examples of a single isolated fact." (Cours, 132.; Course, 92.) When calidum and calidu are already 
established they have to be considered as given. `Identity as norm' cannot be dropped but, to make the two words 
identical and interchangeable, `identity as space' has to be employed at the same time. When Saussure said that the 
transition from calidum to chaud was "via a series of synchronic identities in speech" he presupposed three different 
and mutually exclusive kinds of identity, which is, undoubtedly, an excellent division of labour.
When is it possible to consider a change (e.g. calidu) as a fait de langue? Only when it is not a change any 
longer, that is, when it is accepted by the community. But what has become of calidum by then? If anything, a fait de 
parole, confined to certain individuals. Saussure definitely stated that there is a moment when an innovation is "adopted 
by the community." Here Saussure's translator made another cosmetic change: by stretching the meaning of moment, 
he turned what was in French "moments distincts" into in English as "distinct phases":
"dans l'histoire de toute innovation on rencontre toujours deux moments distincts: 11̊ celui où elle surgit chez les 
individus; 21̊ celui où elle est devenue un fait de langue, identique extérieurement, mais adopté par la collectivité." 
(Cours, 139.)
"in the history of any innovation one always finds two distinct phases: (1) its appearance in individual cases, and (2) its 
incorporation into the language in exactly the same form, but now adopted by the community." (Course, 97.)
In other words, this is exactly the same problem as the relation of war and was. Langue could be continuous in time if it 
contained both war and was but the distinction between fait de langue and fait de parole prevents it from containing 
both. In Saussure's theory one of them must be a fait de parole, or a mistake, or an entity of a different dialect. Bakhtin, 
as far as Saussure's theory is concerned, was not mistaken: "only one linguistic norm can exist: either `ich was' or `ich 
war'". 
Culler is absolutely right when he says: "synchronically speaking, diachronic identities are a distortion, for the 
earlier and the later signs which they relate have no common properties. Each sign has no properties other than the 
specific relational properties which define it within its own synchronic system. From the point of view of systems of 
signs, which after all is the point of view which matters when dealing with signs, the earlier and the later signs are 
wholly disparate." (Culler Saussure, 40.) This is a very clear exposition of Saussure's views. Is, then, language not "a 
series of totally homogeneous synchronic states"? And if they are disparate, it will be a mistake to identify calidum and 
chaud as they are entities in different langues. But Culler does not seem to realize that by multiplying the intervening 
forms between calidum and chaud the number of mistakes will be multiplied as well, unless it is possible to invoke 
different kinds of identity simultaneously.
John Lyons is also right when he says: "One would be quite mistaken if one were to assume that the language of 
a particular `speech community' at a particular time is completely uniform, and that the language-change is a matter of 
the replacement of one homogeneous system of communication by another equally homogeneous system at some 
definite `point' in time." (John Lyons Introduction..., 49.) It is very easy to accept that both assumptions are mistaken, 
even though Lyons does not mention whether anyone has ever committed either of these mistakes or he is just warning 
against a possible error.
The first assumption can be regarded as mistaken, although it is not quite clear what the word `completely' may 
imply. Would not one be equally mistaken if one were to assume that the language of a particular speech community is 
uniform? Does it make any difference? Lyons mentions the two assumptions, the two mistakes in the same sentence. 
The two assumptions are, in fact related: it seems likely that the second follows from the first. Linguistic changes 
would have to be abrupt, if language communities were uniform and the new words, new rules would have to spread 
overnight. Lyons mentions these assumptions when he is discussing Saussure's theory of language, so a naive reader 
might infer that an extremist interpretation of Saussure's views can lead to such a dangerous conclusion. This is not the 
case, it is the proper interpretation. Weinreich, again, was right when he said: "it is easy for the structuralist linguist to 
tie himself into a conceptual knot" (Uriel Weinreich "Mid-Century Linguistics: Attainments and Frustrations" Romance 
Philology 13 (1960) 320-341. 329.), while Fredric Jameson thought that these "knots" are inevitable in any theory: "the 
initial logical problem is grounded, not in Saussure's terminology, but in the thing itself." (Fredric Jameson The Prison-
House of Language: A Critical Account of Structuralism and Russian Formalism Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
1972. 24.)
The difficulties of diachronic linguistics are only consequences of the problems produced by the distinction 
between langue and parole. Saussure thought that as long as some linguistic phenomena "are confined to certain 
individuals, there is no need to take them into account, since our concern is solely with the language [langue]". (Cours, 
138.; Course, 97.) Ignoring the language of "certain individuals" necessarily leads to a simplified view of language.
F. Understanding
The theory of langue is, by definition, a theory of understanding: langue is "the whole set of linguistic habits which 
enables the speaker to understand and make himself understood". (Cours, 112.; Course, 77.) Understanding also 
became the victim of homogenization. "All the individuals linguistically linked in this manner will establish among 
themselves a kind of mean; all of them will reproduce -- doubtless not exactly, but approximately -- the same signs 
linked to the same concepts." (Cours, 29.; Course, 13.) The same signs are linked to the same concepts at the level of 
the community -- as it prefigures in Saussure's `speech circuit'. Still, Saussure knew that he was investigating "a kind of 
mean". Half a century after Saussure, Katz and Fodor wanted to create a semantic theory "without information about 
setting and independent of individual differences between speakers." (Jerrold J. Katz and Jerry A. Fodor "The Structure 
of a Semantic Theory" Language 39 (1963) 170-210. 176.) The expression "individual differences" is somewhat 
misleading. What they failed to consider was any difference between speakers. It is quite obvious that Saussure's 
homogeneous langue and the language investigated by generative semantics show some of the characteristics of the 
language of Eden or at least those of the language before Babel when "the whole earth was of one language, and of one 
speech".
If all the speakers of a language shared the same monolithic langue, it would not be very easy to see how any 
difficulty concerning understanding could be traced back to their langue. Saussure's theory may explain successful 
communication but it has nothing to say about the linguistic resources of misunderstandings which, if they have any 
status in Saussure's theory, must be brought about by mistakes and explained in the categories of pragmatics or 
psychology. Only an immediate, perfect and automatic understanding can follow from Saussure's theory. 
Understanding would be the same as the recognition of forms and the manner of their construction.
John Lyons stated that "Normal communication rests upon the assumption that we all `understand' words in the 
same way...Semantics is concerned with accounting for the degree of uniformity in the `use' of language which makes 
normal communication possible." (Lyons Introduction..., 411.) The expression "normal communication" implies 
statements about the nature of language. It implies, for instance, that there can be another type of communication in 
which we do not understand words in the same way. Is "abnormal communication" communication at all? What are the 
symptoms of 'abnormal communication'? Which discipline is concerned with accounting for communication and 
understanding in language, if semantics is reserved exclusively for the uniform use of language?
The expression "normal communication" also presupposes statements which would deny the homogeneity of 
linguistic phenomena. "Normal" and "abnormal" are obviously of different orders. On the other hand, the function of 
this expression is precisely to create homogeneity - at the price of excluding some phenomena which are regarded as 
abnormal. What is odd about it is that the expression "normal communication" can only have meaning within the 
confines of a theory of language which acknowledges language to be larger than it can deal with. This theory looks 
upon language as an object obviously given and sufficiently defined by pre-theoretical views and tacitly accepts that 
the space circumscribed will not be filled with normal language alone. Istances of abnormal language are recognized as 
instances of language, nor is their meaningfulness doubted, but normal language is seen as displaying the 
characteristics of language proper. Although the situation is certainly odd, it can be tolerated, if the theory remains 
what it is: a theory that can discover the homogeneity and order it presupposes, and where it presupposes; a theory of 
normal language as distinct from a theory of language which should include everything that can be regarded as 
linguistic. These tacit assumptions, however, tend to be forgotten. When the limitations of normal language are 
forgotten, the theory of normal language will be thought of as the theory of language. A theory of normal language as a 
model of language can still be useful for various purposes but one thing is certain: it cannot do justice for what can be 
considered as its opposite, the rules observed by "quelques personnes". The assumption of linguistic homogeneity 
could solve all the problems of understanding very elegantly and summarily by presupposing it but is this the way to do 
it?
G. Writing
There is another strange consequence following from Saussure's theory of language. If it is true that:
(1.) "the linguistic sign is invariable", (Cours, 105.; Course, 72.)
(2.) "writing tends to remain fixed", (Cours, 48.; Course, 27.)
(3.) "the language [langue] we use is a convention, and it makes no difference what exactly the nature of the agreed 
sign is. The question of the vocal apparatus is thus a secondary one as far as the problem of language [langage] is 
concerned", (Cours, 26.; Course, 10.)
then it is not very easy not to draw the conclusion that writing would be a better medium of langue than speech. This 
possibility should be considered even though Saussure emphasized the primacy of speech. Why is langue more 
intimately related to parole than to writing?
"A language and its written form [Langue et écriture] constitute two separate systems of signs. The sole reason for the 
existence of the latter is to represent the former." (Cours, 45.; Course, 24.)
But it must be noted that `langue' here has to mean `langue and parole', that is, langage, otherwise writing would 
represent langue, the system of rules. If writing represented langue, the task of the linguist would be extremely easy: 
writing in itself would constitute a perfect grammar. But it is not possible to replace langue with langage in the 
sentence quoted. Langage is "unknowable" [inconnaissable]. Neither is it possible to insert parole or langage into the 
sentence instead of langue for the very simple reason they do not not constitute systems of signs. Which word should 
replace langue? Why is langue more intimately related to parole than to writing?
"a language [la langue] is in a constant process of evolution, whereas writing tends to remain fixed." (Cours, 48.; 
Course, 27.)
It is not very easy to establish what Saussure meant by langue when he opposed it with writing. Language and writing 
could be opposed in such a manner only if the two points of view, the synchronic and the diachronic were not 
incommensurable. The sentence seems to refer to an undivided unity of language and its history. But Saussure also said 
that "The panchronic point of view never gets to grips with specific facts of language structure [langue]." (Cours, 135.; 
Course, 94.)
What is, then, the medium of langue?
